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Post-quantum authentication

Post-quantum cryptography protects two different things. Secrecy means a call recorded today stays unreadable to someone who builds a quantum computer later. Authentication means that same quantum computer can’t pretend to be someone it isn’t. MOQOM is post-quantum for both.

Every key that protects content is agreed or sealed with post-quantum cryptography:

  • Room keys. Devices agree each room’s keys with MLS in the cipher suite MLS_256_MLKEM1024_AES256GCM_SHA512_MLDSA87, the only suite, whose key agreement is ML-KEM-1024. Every part of it is NIST category 5. It is the category-5 suite of draft-ietf-mls-pq-ciphersuites; see moqom-mls.
  • Media. SFrame encrypts every frame with AES-256-GCM. A 256-bit symmetric key keeps about 128 bits of security against a quantum computer.
  • Large broadcasts. With sender keys, each viewer’s device makes an ML-KEM-1024 key pair, and each epoch’s key is sealed to it with HPKE over ML-KEM-1024.
  • Connections. TLS 1.3 runs on every connection, and its key exchange is ML-KEM-1024 only, on every device connection (media, sign-in and token renewal, MLS key delivery) and on every link between MOQOM’s servers. The Swift SDK connects through MOQOM’s own QUIC and TLS library (rustls with AWS-LC), so the SDK chooses the key exchange. Classical-only key exchange is refused everywhere. See End-to-end encryption for api.moqom.cloud, which browsers also reach.

Every signature that says who someone is uses ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204):

What’s signed Algorithm
Each device’s identity key, generated in the Secure Enclave and never exportable ML-DSA-87
The device credential: the proof of possession every relay demands ML-DSA-87
Every MLS KeyPackage ML-DSA-87
Every MLS commit ML-DSA-87
Every MLS message signature, handshake and application messages alike ML-DSA-87
Direct tickets issued by relays ML-DSA-87
Join tokens, signed and then sealed with AES-256-GCM ML-DSA-87
The room’s control log ML-DSA-87

There is no classical signature algorithm anywhere in that list, and none is accepted. Relays refuse ES256 proofs, verifiers refuse Ed25519 tokens, and a key set that contains an elliptic curve key is refused when it is loaded.

A quantum computer that can break elliptic curves can work out a private key from its public key. Public keys are public by design: they’re published, exchanged and compared in safety numbers. Against classical identity keys, that quantum computer could impersonate a contact or forge identity keys in new sessions. The safety number would still match, because the public key is the real one; the attacker simply holds its private half too.

Post-quantum secrecy alone doesn’t stop this. It keeps recordings unreadable, but an active attacker who can sign as you can join a new conversation as you. With ML-DSA-87 identity keys, impersonation is quantum-resistant too.

Signal added post-quantum key agreement with PQXDH in 2023 and its post-quantum ratchet, SPQR, in 2025, so recorded Signal messages stay secret against a future quantum computer. Signal’s identity keys and signatures are Curve25519 and XEdDSA, which are classical. Signal’s own PQXDH specification states that its authentication relies on classical assumptions and isn’t secure against an active quantum attacker. So a future quantum computer couldn’t read recorded Signal messages, but it could impersonate a contact or forge identity keys.

What’s signed MOQOM Signal
Recorded messages stay secret Yes Yes
Long-term identity key ML-DSA-87 Curve25519
Prekeys or KeyPackages signed with ML-DSA-87 XEdDSA
Impersonation by a future quantum computer Resisted Possible in new sessions

Signal column: our reading of Signal’s published specifications as of October 2026.

Two signatures in the path are made by others with classical algorithms. Neither can sign as an existing device.

  • Certificate signatures in TLS. Relay certificates, and the Let’s Encrypt certificates on MOQOM’s public endpoints, are ECDSA or RSA, because the WebPKI has no post-quantum certificates yet. The key exchange is post-quantum; the certificate’s signature is not. Phones accept only the exact relay certificate they were given, every proof is bound to that certificate, and media is end-to-end encrypted regardless. Forging the handshake would need a working quantum computer during the connection, and would get ciphertext.
  • Apple’s sign-in. Sign in with Apple identity tokens and App Attest are signed by Apple with classical algorithms. Someone who could forge one could at most enroll a new device. That device joins the room’s group as a new ML-DSA-87 key that every member sees; it can’t sign as an existing device. If your own backend signs people in, how it does so is your choice.

An ML-DSA-87 signature is 4,627 bytes and a public key is 2,592 bytes, against 64 and 32 bytes for Ed25519. The cost is paid once per handshake or proof, not per media frame, so it adds nothing to the media itself. Joining and key changes carry larger messages; streaming does not.