Specifications
Protocol and transport
Section titled “Protocol and transport”| Protocol | IETF draft-ietf-moq-transport-22 and -19, own implementation in Rust and in Swift, written independently |
| Control messages | All 18 in draft-19 |
| Proposed extension | Hop limit for relays (draft-elliottwave-moq-hop-limit-00) |
| Data plane | Object datagrams, subgroup streams, fetch streams with gap markers |
| Carriers | Raw QUIC and WebTransport (HTTP/3) on one UDP port |
| QUIC stack (relay) | quinn, vendored unmodified |
| QUIC stack (Apple) | MOQOM’s own Rust QUIC and TLS library (quinn and rustls with AWS-LC, through moqom-direct-ffi), shipped as an XCFramework inside the SDK |
| Relay forwarding | Subgroup streams. Datagram forwarding not yet carried |
| Scale-out | Multiple SO_REUSEPORT sockets per relay |
Relay behaviour
Section titled “Relay behaviour”| Upstream deduplication | Each track pulled from the publisher once, whatever the audience |
| Slow viewers | Never allowed to stall the room or the publisher |
| Retention | Bounded by groups, bytes and seconds, evicting whole groups; can be disabled |
| Join | New subscribers fetch the group in progress, so playback starts on a keyframe |
| Publisher stop | Every viewer is told explicitly |
| Quotas | Per device and per user: sessions, subscriptions, announcements, watches and fetches |
| Observability | Separate admin port (off by default): Prometheus metrics, JSON snapshots of sessions, rooms and tracks, liveness and readiness, QUIC RTT / cwnd / loss, track-silence detection |
Security
Section titled “Security”| Transport | TLS 1.3, inherent in QUIC, on every media connection; ML-KEM-1024 key exchange only on every device connection (media, sign-in and token renewal, MLS key delivery) and every link between MOQOM’s servers; classical-only key exchange refused |
| Tokens | ML-DSA-87-signed, and no other algorithm is accepted (Ed25519 tokens are refused); tenant, room, grants and expiry checked against every namespace a request names |
| Token lifetime | 10 minutes default, 15 minutes maximum; renewed during a session without reconnecting |
| Device binding | Every token is bound to a key in the device’s Secure Enclave; the control plane refuses to mint one that isn’t. That key is ML-DSA-87 and signs every proof of possession; relays refuse ES256 (P-256) proofs |
| Authentication | Post-quantum: every signature that says who someone is, from device identity keys and proofs to MLS KeyPackages, commits and messages, direct tickets, join tokens and the room’s control log, is ML-DSA-87. See Post-quantum authentication |
| Revocation | A ban ends the live session, not only the next join |
| Media encryption | SFrame (RFC 9605) over MOQT, AES-256-GCM by default, AES-128-GCM supported; payload-only, so relay caching and priority survive |
| E2EE key management | MLS (RFC 9420) for calls and rooms up to a few hundred devices, one cipher suite, MLS_256_MLKEM1024_AES256GCM_SHA512_MLDSA87 (0xF0AC; post-quantum ML-KEM-1024 key agreement, ML-DSA-87 signatures, NIST category 5 throughout); sender keys for large audiences, sealed to each viewer’s ML-KEM-1024 key |
| Security libraries | moqom-token, moqom-proof, moqom-sframe, moqom-mls in Swift, Go and Rust, Apache-2.0, one shared set of test vectors. See Security libraries |
See Security.
Limits
Section titled “Limits”| Limit | Value |
|---|---|
| Client token lifetime | ≤ 15 minutes |
| Usage records per report | ≤ 5,000 |
| Usage record interval | ≤ 86,400 seconds |
| Billing request body | ≤ 1 MiB |
| Join request body | ≤ 4 KiB |
| Join rate | 30 / minute / credential |
| Signups | 5 / hour / client address |
| Top-up amount | $10.00 – $10,000.00 |
| Username | ≤ 4,096 UTF-8 bytes, NFC-normalised |
| Default stage slots / watchdog limit | 8 / 8 per room |
Platforms
Section titled “Platforms”| SDK | Floor | Status |
|---|---|---|
MoqomKit (Swift) |
iOS, iPadOS, macOS, visionOS, tvOS 26; Swift 6 strict concurrency | Available (binary core) |
moqom-go |
Go 1.23+ | Available |
moqom-rust |
Toolchain pinned in repo | Available |
| Web | Evergreen browsers with WebTransport | In progress, coming Q4 2026 |
| Android | — | In progress, coming Q4 2026 |
| Desktop | Windows, macOS, Linux | In progress, coming Q4 2026 |
| OBS plugin | OBS Studio | Scoped, work ongoing |
Not yet, stated so nobody quotes it
Section titled “Not yet, stated so nobody quotes it”- Datagram forwarding at the relay
- Authentication on the relay admin port (which is why it is off by default)
- Global steering and a multi-replica control plane
- MLS / sender-key E2EE key management