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Specifications

Protocol IETF draft-ietf-moq-transport-22 and -19, own implementation in Rust and in Swift, written independently
Control messages All 18 in draft-19
Proposed extension Hop limit for relays (draft-elliottwave-moq-hop-limit-00)
Data plane Object datagrams, subgroup streams, fetch streams with gap markers
Carriers Raw QUIC and WebTransport (HTTP/3) on one UDP port
QUIC stack (relay) quinn, vendored unmodified
QUIC stack (Apple) MOQOM’s own Rust QUIC and TLS library (quinn and rustls with AWS-LC, through moqom-direct-ffi), shipped as an XCFramework inside the SDK
Relay forwarding Subgroup streams. Datagram forwarding not yet carried
Scale-out Multiple SO_REUSEPORT sockets per relay
Upstream deduplication Each track pulled from the publisher once, whatever the audience
Slow viewers Never allowed to stall the room or the publisher
Retention Bounded by groups, bytes and seconds, evicting whole groups; can be disabled
Join New subscribers fetch the group in progress, so playback starts on a keyframe
Publisher stop Every viewer is told explicitly
Quotas Per device and per user: sessions, subscriptions, announcements, watches and fetches
Observability Separate admin port (off by default): Prometheus metrics, JSON snapshots of sessions, rooms and tracks, liveness and readiness, QUIC RTT / cwnd / loss, track-silence detection
Transport TLS 1.3, inherent in QUIC, on every media connection; ML-KEM-1024 key exchange only on every device connection (media, sign-in and token renewal, MLS key delivery) and every link between MOQOM’s servers; classical-only key exchange refused
Tokens ML-DSA-87-signed, and no other algorithm is accepted (Ed25519 tokens are refused); tenant, room, grants and expiry checked against every namespace a request names
Token lifetime 10 minutes default, 15 minutes maximum; renewed during a session without reconnecting
Device binding Every token is bound to a key in the device’s Secure Enclave; the control plane refuses to mint one that isn’t. That key is ML-DSA-87 and signs every proof of possession; relays refuse ES256 (P-256) proofs
Authentication Post-quantum: every signature that says who someone is, from device identity keys and proofs to MLS KeyPackages, commits and messages, direct tickets, join tokens and the room’s control log, is ML-DSA-87. See Post-quantum authentication
Revocation A ban ends the live session, not only the next join
Media encryption SFrame (RFC 9605) over MOQT, AES-256-GCM by default, AES-128-GCM supported; payload-only, so relay caching and priority survive
E2EE key management MLS (RFC 9420) for calls and rooms up to a few hundred devices, one cipher suite, MLS_256_MLKEM1024_AES256GCM_SHA512_MLDSA87 (0xF0AC; post-quantum ML-KEM-1024 key agreement, ML-DSA-87 signatures, NIST category 5 throughout); sender keys for large audiences, sealed to each viewer’s ML-KEM-1024 key
Security libraries moqom-token, moqom-proof, moqom-sframe, moqom-mls in Swift, Go and Rust, Apache-2.0, one shared set of test vectors. See Security libraries

See Security.

Limit Value
Client token lifetime ≤ 15 minutes
Usage records per report ≤ 5,000
Usage record interval ≤ 86,400 seconds
Billing request body ≤ 1 MiB
Join request body ≤ 4 KiB
Join rate 30 / minute / credential
Signups 5 / hour / client address
Top-up amount $10.00 – $10,000.00
Username ≤ 4,096 UTF-8 bytes, NFC-normalised
Default stage slots / watchdog limit 8 / 8 per room
SDK Floor Status
MoqomKit (Swift) iOS, iPadOS, macOS, visionOS, tvOS 26; Swift 6 strict concurrency Available (binary core)
moqom-go Go 1.23+ Available
moqom-rust Toolchain pinned in repo Available
Web Evergreen browsers with WebTransport In progress, coming Q4 2026
Android — In progress, coming Q4 2026
Desktop Windows, macOS, Linux In progress, coming Q4 2026
OBS plugin OBS Studio Scoped, work ongoing
  • Datagram forwarding at the relay
  • Authentication on the relay admin port (which is why it is off by default)
  • Global steering and a multi-replica control plane
  • MLS / sender-key E2EE key management